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There has been considerable debate in the last few years over
whether the antitrust laws of the United States unduly disadvantage
American businessmen in international trade situations.' Recent events
indicate that, despite continuing concern about export promotion,
the most crucial foreign trade problems for our nation in the near
future will likely arise on the buying rather than the selling side.2
Traditionally, most countries have policies, including antitrust ex-
emptions, designed to encourage exports.3 Such programs have usually
been based on the assumption that an excess of exports over imports
is a "favorable" balance of trade, since the nation thus becomes a
creditor rather than a debtor in monetary terms.4 Our position as
t" Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice.
The views expressed are entirely personal and are not intended as expressions of the
official position of any governmental agency.
1. See, e.g., Hearings on International Aspects of Antitrust Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
2. See generally Bergsten, The Threat is Real, FOREIGN POLICY, Spring 1974, at 84;
Bergsten, The Threat from the Third World, FOREIGN POLICY, Summer 1973, at 102;
Krasner, Oil Is the Exception, FOREIGN POLICY, Spring 1974, at 68; Mikdashi, Collusion
Could Work, FOREIGN POLICY, Spring 1974, at 57; Symposium, One Too Many OPEC's,
FOREIGN POLICY, Spring 1974, at 57-99.
3. Most United States programs to encourage exports are handled under the auspices
of the Office of Export Promotion within the Department of Commerce. This office
offers advice, guidance and limited forms of assistance to would-be exporters. Exports
are also promoted through tax incentives. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 994(c). For a
number of years exports were indirectly encouraged by laws and regulations limiting the
amount of direct American foreign investment. This was administered by the Office of
Foreign Direct Investment Control in the Department of Commerce.
On the antitrust side, the major device to encourage exports is the Vebb-Pomerene
Export Trade Act of 1918, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1970), which requires a group of firms
associated for the sole purpose of export trade to register with the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC). The export activities of such associations are expressly exempted from
the antitrust laws, provided that the agreements and acts of the association do not re-
strain trade within the United States, artificially enhance or depress prices within the
United States, or restrain the export trade of any domestic competitor of the association.
See generally Chapman, Exports and Antitrust: Must Competition Stop at the Water's
Edge?, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 399 (1973).
4. On the other hand, most economists agree that the balance of trade is theoretically
self-correcting, P.B. KENEN . R. LUBITZ, INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMIcs 57-78 (3d ed. 1964);
C.P. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 38-54 (4th ed. 1958); P. SAMIUELSON, Eco-
NOMIcs 625 (8th ed. 1970), and many argue that goods are the only real wealth. Under
this theory, a nation should seek a surplus of imports, since it will thus actually be
"richer" than a nation with a surplus of gold or currency. See B.J. MooRE, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO MODERN EcoNomic THEORY 492-93 (1973); P. SAMUELSON, supra, at 621-39.
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an exporter has recently been greatly improved by the hard but neces-
sary step of devaluation of our currency. That measure, combined
with others of less significance, resulted in a "positive" balance of
payments for a few months,5 and might do so again if our problems
as a consumer nation can be controlled.
As a buyer, we are faced with increasing dependence on imported
commodities. World commodity shortages, major competition from
Europe and Japan for scarce resources, and state monopolies and
concerted producer cartels have forced us to pay much higher prices
for many commodities." Suggested solutions to our problem as a
buyer of scarce or monopolized goods have included retaliative boy-
cotts, 7 collective buying and bargaining groups,8 government inter-
vention in purchasing,0 and even collaboration with other purchasing
governments. 10 A number of these suggestions raise important issues
concerning how our antitrust laws should be interpreted, and even
whether they should be altered. We should recognize that even gov-
ernment joint action raises implicit questions of antitrust policy,
broadly viewed. The basis of our antitrust laws is a dedication to
the ideal of free markets at home and abroad, in which numerous
private buyers and sellers transact business without resort to cartels
or boycotts. However, in the midst of international economic war-
fare-whether conducted by corporations with government sanction
or by governments themselves-the underpinning of the antitrust laws
may be abandoned, and progress toward free and open world markets
could be stifled in the name of national advantage.
The primary purpose of this article is to analyze American anti-
trust law and policy as it applies to international buying groups. To
5. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 1973, at 5, col. 3; May 28, 1974, at 2, col. 2; Oct.
18, 1974, at 3, col. 3.
6. See, e.g., OPEC for Oil; CIPEC for Copper: What Next-A BAUPEC for Bauxite?,
FORBES, Feb. 15, 1974, at 49; Cartel Phobia, NEWCWEEK, Jan. 28, 1974, at 60; OPEC Moves
to Check Consumer Cartel, OIL & GAS J., Mar. 26, 1973, at 42; New Export Cartel: Union
of Banana Exporting Countries, TIME, Apr. 29, 1974, at 94; Nations with Raw Materials
-Can They Gang Up on U.S.?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 6, 1974, at 76-77.
7. E.g., H.R. 13840 & S.3282, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (proposed amendments to the
Export Administration Act submitted by the Dep't of Commerce authorizing the Presi-
dent, inter alia, to impose export controls in order to retaliate against nations that un-
reasonably restrict U.S. access to a commodity). See Landauer, Crude Tactics: How the
State Department Helped Big Oil Firms Try to Thwart Libya, Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1974,
at 1, col. I.
8. Some 19 Farm Co-Ops Form Trading Group to Buy Foreign Fuel, Wall St. J., Mar.
14, 1974, at 25, col. 6.
9. Senator Church has advocated legislation to this effect. See N.Y. Times, June 6,
1974, at 1, col. 1.
10. At the height of the energy crisis caused in part by the Arab boycott, the U.S.
Department of State moved in this direction. 70 DEPT STATE BULL. 201-22 (1974); OPEC
Moves to Check Consumer Cartel, OIL & GAs J., Mar. 26, 1973, at 42.
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do this, we must first decide whether the antitrust laws as applied to
domestic commerce allow competitive or potentially competitive com-
panies to engage in cooperative or joint buying. If under some cir-
cumstances such conduct is unlawful, it must then be determined
whether a different conclusion results when the buying group op-
erates abroad in purchasing from foreign sellers. We shall next con-
sider whether the answer to this latter question depends on the fact
that the buyers are confronted with a foreign monopoly or cartel,
or are bargaining with a foreign state about taxes or royalties rather
than with private sellers about the price of foreign goods. Assuming
that international buying groups are legal in some situations, the
antitrust laws are examined to assess what conditions are imposed
on access to or membership in such groups, on the bargaining in-
dependence of those in the group, and on the scope of agreements
or activities of the group. Finally, this article focuses on the proper
role of the United States government in relation to international
buying groups and, in particular, whether the government should
only define the rules for the existence of these gToups or whether it
should instead concern itself with the substance of their negotiating
positions.
I. The Antitrust Legality of Domestic Buying Groups
It seems undeniable that virtually any buying group involves some
restraint on competition among buyers. If, for instance, potential
buyers of a product appoint one or more of their number as nego-
tiators and instruct them as to what price, or range of prices, to
offer or accept, the members to that extent restrict their own freedom
to bid separately or on differing terms for the commodity being
purchased." Further, if the buyers authorize their negotiator to re-
fuse to deal if the price is not as low as they wish, they have im-
plicitly threatened the seller with a boycott, which is a restraint
normally condemned as illegal per se under § 1 of the Sherman Act.
12
In fact, it has been long settled that the Sherman Act ban on
conspiracies in restraint of trade prohibits concerted buying by a group
with market power. The courts will not accept the defense that such
11. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Blue Cross v.
Commonwealth, 211 Va. 180, 176 S.E.2d 439 (1970); cf. United States v. United States
Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
12. Kors, Inc. v. Broadway Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941);
Boyle v. United States, 40 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1930).
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joint buying might produce a lower price for the consumer. As
early as 1905 the Supreme Court condemned an agreement among
leading meatpackers pursuant to which, among other things, they
refrained from bidding against each other for livestock. 13
Other cases have reached the same conclusion. In Live Poultry
Dealers Protective Association v. United States,14 the Government
sought to prohibit an arrangement under which many of the poultry
buyers in New York appointed a negotiating committee authorized
to bid for poultry to obtain a "market price," which would usually
then be the price on all transactions during that day. The parties
agreed that prior to this plan "the prices for live poultry had been
determined without any rule and according to the higgling of the
buyers and the sellers."'1 Defendants attempted to justify their plan
as reasonable, arguing that an unstabilized market "resulted in frauds
upon the buyers and in the end a higher price to the consumers."' 6
In rejecting this defense, Judge Learned Hand stated that:
[I]t is somewhat surprising at this day to hear it suggested that
a frank agreement to fix prices and prevent competition as re-
gards them among one-half the buyers in a given market may be
defended, on the notion that the results are economically desir-
able. We should have supposed that, if one thing were definitely
settled, it was that the Sherman Act forbade all agreements pre-
venting competition in price among a group of buyers, otherwise
competitive, if they are numerous enough to affect the market.
17
Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co.'8 in-
volved a monopolistic buying group that was charged with violating
§§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Three large sugar refiners in northern
California agreed to pay uniform prices for sugar beets. These re-
finers were the only practical market for beets grown in northern
California. The Supreme Court held that the price-fixing agreement
by purchasers was a Sherman Act violation, but did not specifically
rule that the buying group itself was illegal.' 9
13. Swift &- Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). For a more recent case involving
concerted buying. see United States v. Intercontinental Fur Corp.,. Criminal No. 68 CR
764 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The indictment alleged that defendants agreed to allocate lots of
sealskins on which they would bid or refrain from bidding against each other. Each
defendant pleaded nolo contendere and was fined.
14. 4 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1924).
15. Id. at 841.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 842.
18. 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
19. Id. at 227.
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In National Macaroni Manufacturing Association v. FTC,20 the
complaint charged an association of macaroni manufacturers with
acting collectively to suppress competition. These manufacturers ac-
counted for 70 percent of United States macaroni production. The
association fixed the ingredients of the macaroni in order to reduce
the demand for, and hence the price of, durum wheat. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the FTC's finding of a per se violation of § 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act. However, the court went on
to state:
It seems appropriate to note here that in the instant case the
Commission did not hold that all efforts at product standardiza-
tion, or all buying agencies or other cooperative buying arrange-
ments, or all attempts to cope with scarcity or other conditions of
economic dislocation are unlawful under the antitrust laws.21
As the court of appeals noted in National Macaroni, it is well
known that many forms of joint buying groups do exist, even in the
domestic economy, and generally are not challenged under the anti-
trust laws. On occasion, particular joint buying arrangements have
been held legal by the courts or granted clearances by antitrust en-
forcement agencies. Examples include small theater owners jointly
purchasing films, small grocers purchasing foodstuffs in bulk, and
greeting card buyers using a buying corporation.2 2 In the case in-
volving joint buying by greeting card distributors, the Examiner and
the FTC, in approving the plan, stressed that its members accounted
together for only $3 million out of $250 million sales in the in-
dustry.2
3
There appear to be two reasons for this exception to the general
condemnation of conspiracies and combinations. First, the members
are able to achieve joint economies of purchasing scale that they
could not obtain alone, and thus enhance their ability to compete
with larger buyers in the market. In addition, because the partici-
pants are so small and insignificant in terms of market share that
a complete merger of their facilities would be unobjectionable un-
20. 345 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1965).
21. Id. at 427.
22. Central Retailer-Owned Groceries, Inc. v. FTC, 319 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963) (small
grocers); Arkansas Brokerage Co. v. Dunn & Powell, Inc., 173 F. 899 (8th Cir. 1909)
(mercantile jobbers); G & P Amusement Co. v. Regent Theatre Co., 107 F. Supp. 453
(N.D. Ohio 1952), afJd, 216 F.2d 749 (6th Cir. 1954) (theatres); Mid-West Theatres Co. V.
Co-Operative Theatres, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 216 (E.D. Mich. 1941) (theatres); Associated
Greeting Card Distrib.. 50 F.T.C. 631 (1954).
23. 50 F.T.C. at 631, 633, 634.
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der the antitrust laws, there can be no objection to their engaging
in joint purchasing, a form of integration which falls short of mer-
ger or consolidation.2
4
The legality of domestic buying groups is governed not only by
the Sherman Act but also by §§ 2(c), 2(e) and 2(f) of the Robinson-
Patman Act.25 These provisions are aimed at preventing a powerful
buyer (single or group) from receiving or inducing discounts or al-
lowances not available on equal terms to smaller buyers or justified
by cost saving resulting from the quantity purchased or method of
purchasing. Thus, in a sense the antitrust and price-discrimination
laws prohibit not only the methods of powerful buying groups, but
also their achievements. Still, many buying groups or cooperatives do
pass muster under the Robinson-Patman Act. The rationale for this
is that small retailers should be able to combine in order to equal
large commercial chains in buying power and efficiency.2
It appears from this discussion that one can formulate an approxi-
mate rule governing the legality of joint domestic buying arrange-
ments: If the joint buying arrangement is necessary to achieve genuine
economies of scale that are important and not attainable by the mem-
bers acting separately, and if the joint purchasing group as a whole does
not account for an economically significant percentage of the com-
modity or service being purchased,27 then such a group should be
generally unobjectionable under the antitrust laws. 28 While many
24. See Kintner, Romano & Filippin, Cooperative Buying and Antitrust Policy: The
Search for Competitive Equality, 41 GEO. NVASH. L. REV. 971 (1973); Mezines, Group
Buying: When Is It Permitted Under the Robinson-Patman Act?, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 729
(1969).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c), (e), (f) (1970).
26. Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, 319 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1963). FTC
Chairman Paul R. Dixon stated:
[C]ombination in one form or another by small firms may be essential to their
survival, particularly in those industries characterized by massive aggregates of
corporate power. The growth of the giant food chains, for example, revolutionized
the behavior of small independent grocery stores. They were quickly faced with
the alternative of constructing cooperative buying arrangements or extermination.
Certainly many independent food stores long ago would have withered before the
competitive threat of large chains had they not formed retailer-owned cooperative
wholesalers ....
Address before the Economic Club of Detroit, Mar. 12, 1962, quoted in 319 F.2d at 415,
and in National Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 1208, 1247 (1962) (dissenting
opinion).
27. Perhaps 10 percent of the market would be such an "economically significant"
market share; cf. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (Standard Stations case).
28. See C. KAYSEN &. D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 153 (1959):
[I]n the absence of evidence of intent to reduce price competition or of actual
effects on price that are unrelated to cost savings the test would be whether... the
joint buying agency has the power to depress prices by withholding demand .... If
the exclusive joint agency is found to possess such power, it would be held illegal
in the absence of a clear showing that there are substantial economies which cannot
be achieved by a nonexclusive agency or by independent firms.
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buying groups would be acceptable, this test would certainly not permit
the leading firms in an industry to join together.
II. The Relevance of the International Context
The, preceding section indicates that, even in the international
context, American antitrust law would probably not prohibit or
punish buying groups which both lack market power and are reason-
ably necessary to achieve economic efficiency. The harder questions
arise when the proposed international buying group clearly does pos-
sess significant market power because its members include the largest
firms in the American market or a high percentage of all firms in
that market. The issue is highlighted when the American buying
syndicate is defended precisely because it will enable its members
to exact lower prices from the foreign sellers than would be obtain-
able if the foreigners could play one American buyer off against
another. There can be little doubt that a domestic buying group
with such power would be illegal under the Sherman Act, and that
the defense of obtaining lower prices or stabilizing the market would
be rejected, as it was in Live Poultry Dealers.
The primary theoretical justification for the legality of American
buying groups operating abroad would be that America lacks legisla-
tive jurisdiction to protect foreigners from anticompetitive practices;
or that, even if Congress possesses such power, it had no intent to be-
stow the benefits of Sherman Act protection on foreigners. Put another
way, the reasoning is that since the only victims of such a conspiracy
would be foreigners, since a probable result of the joint action would
be higher profits for American companies, and since cost savings might
be passed on through lower prices for American consumers, the Sher-
man Act should not be interpreted to prohibit such an agreement.
Experts in the field appear to disagree on whether the Sherman Act
proscribes a conspiracy among Americans in United States foreign
commerce which injures only foreigners. Kingman Brewster con-
cluded in 1958 that the Sherman Act probably would not and should
not apply in such circumstances:
A restraint which on its face only governs activity within or among
foreign nations would seem prima facie outside the legislative
jurisdiction. Even a naked restraint on foreign local or "third-
market" commerce would seem subject to liability if, and only if,
the government could prove the effect on competition in United
States domestic or foreign commerce. 29
29. K. BREWSTE.R, JR., ANTITRUST AND AM ERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 82 (1958).
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Dean Rahl, relying on a more literal reading of the statute, recently
offered a somewhat broader interpretation of the Sherman Act:
But it may be said, if the restraint does not hurt U.S. commerce,
or if it actually helps it, why should the Act apply? Foreign trade
and foreign markets, it is argued, should be viewed differently
from domestic problems-in our own self-interest, and because it
is not the business of Congress to concern itself with restraints
inflicted by Americans upon foreigners abroad. One answer might
be the direct one that it would not be so strange for Congress to
be concerned with what our businesses do to foreigners. If we are
concerned with warfare and crime carried on by Americans abroad,
we might reasonably be concerned with the infliction of economic
damage abroad by conduct considered illegal at home.
But that answer might still miss the point. Personally, I would
stick to what I consider to be the only reliable guide to the scope
of the Act-that is, that the Act is concerned with restraints of
competition which occur in, or which substantially affect any of
the commerce, interstate or foreign, which Congress regulates.30
In support of Rahl's view, it can be said that well-settled principles
of international and American constitutional law would certainly
allow Congress to forbid joint activities by Americans which injure
foreigners abroad.31 One ground for such legislative reach would
be the adverse effect which such conspiracies might have on American
foreign trade and foreign policy.32 If we permitted our businessmen
to combine against foreign sellers, the foreigners or their governments
might retaliate in ways injurious to other American businessmen, to
American foreign trade or to American foreign relations. It is cer-
tainly possible that foreign sellers, faced with a powerful buying
30. Address by Rahl, American Antitrust and Foreign Operations: What Is Covered?,
at 9, Northwestern Univ. Law School Corporate Counsel Institute, Oct. 3, 1973.
31. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1931). This case involved the con-
stitutionality of a federal statute providing for personal service of subpoenas on American
citizens residing in a foreign country. The Court held that Congress had legislative
power to apply U.S. law to acts of American citizens done outside the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States. Id. at 436-38. In Branchs v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944),
petitioner was chargcd under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act with unfair
business practices in the operation of a correspondence school distributing correspondence
courses by mail to Latin America. In upholding jurisdiction over his activities the court
stated:
The right of the United States to control the conduct of its citizens in foreign
countries in respect to matters which a sovereign ordinarily governs within its own
territory has been recognized repeatedly [citing Blackmer v. United States, supra].
Congress has the power to prevent unfair trade practices in foreign commerce by
citizens of the United States, although some of the acts are done outside the ter-
ritorial limits of the United States.
141 F.2d at 35. See generally United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 341 U.S. 593
(1951).
32. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57-60 (1958); Ramey v. United States, 230 F.2d
171 (5th Cir. 1956); cf. Friend v. United States, 100 F.2d 691, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
275
The Yale Law Journal
group, might well choose to respond by forming some sort of selling
group or export cartel, or by requesting that their government be-
come their sales agent. Most trading nations are quite permissive
or even encouraging about the formation of export cartels, so this
result would not be at all unlikely. Since the Sherman Act by its
terms applies to all conspiracies which restrain American foreign
commerce, there is a great deal of appeal to Rahl's argument that
once it is proved that American foreign commerce is being col-
lusively restrained, the identity of the direct or indirect victims is
irrelevant.3
3
Moreover, it is not at all certain that a conspiracy to obtain
lower prices from foreign sellers cannot itself injure American busi-
nessmen or consumers. For instance, if there are American sellers
of the product which is jointly purchased abroad at prices below
normal market value, the effect of the joint purchasing on the
American competitors could be approximately the same as if the
foreign product had been "dumped" on the American market at
less than fair value. Thus, the American sellers might be prevented
from competing effectively by a conspiracy of American buyers to
purchase abroad. In addition, if the product is not available in the
United States, or is in short supply, the joint purchasers might be
able to retain the entire amount attributable to their bargaining
strength as "excess" profits; such control over the product might
entrench the dominant position of these firms, thereby discouraging
potential entrants into the field.34 It could still be argued that the
effect of the joint purchasing was to increase the profits of American
firms at the expense of foreigners, but there would be no truth to
the argument that the joint purchasing produced any benefit for ul-
timate consumers in America. There is also the danger that higher
rather than lower prices would result. Of course, it can be assumed
that American antitrust law would absolutely prohibit joint pur-
chasers from agreeing to the resale price in America. 35 But uniform,
supracompetitive prices might emerge anyway as a result of identical
costs of purchase and the individually perceived common interest,
33. See Todhunter Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 2190 (E.D. Pa.,
Oct. 11, 1974) (relief available to dealer cut off in British Bahamas); Kuwait v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co., 333 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (Kuwait in "person" entitled to damages if
overcharged in U.S. foreign commerce).
34. Cases construing the Clayton Act merger provision indicate that competition by a
potential entrant into the field is relevant. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. FTC, 386 U.S.
568 (1967).
35. United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
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especially if the joint purchasing group was oligopolistic in nature,
i.e., dominated by a few large members. Finally, as a legal matter,
it should be recalled that American antitrust law strictly applied con-
demns agreements to lower prices as well as to raise them.30
Another concern about competitor cooperation in an international
selling or buying group composed of the major firms in the domestic
market is that contact and mutual aid among formerly competing
firms may eventually encourage or facilitate collusion to limit domes-
tic competition. Although it would be illegal for American firms to
employ joint international bargaining as a disguise for a scheme to
eliminate domestic competition,3 7 only the naive could deny the
possibility that the existence of frequent opportunities for private
business discussions may ultimately result in such collusion. Long-
standing and substantial cooperation in international dealings very
well may dull the appetite for fierce rivalry at home. Judge Wy-
zanski voiced a similar concern in narrowly construing the Webb-
Pomerene Act exemption to the antitrust laws for joint foreign selling
groups:
The intimate association of the principal American producers
in day-to-day manufacturing operations, their exchange of patent
licenses and industrial know-how, and their common experience
in marketing and fixing prices may inevitably reduce their zeal
for competition inter sese in the American market .... 38
Certainly, international buying groups raise this same problem of
creating opportunities for collusion affecting domestic purchasers.
First, such buying groups tend to create identical costs for firms who
will resell in the United States, which provides a convenient basis
for setting identical prices. Second, there is simply the suspicion that
"familiarity breeds attempt."
Unlike Webb-Pomerene export associations, buying groups do not
have to register their existence or submit reports to federal authorities.
It is possible that if a buying group sought a business review letter
from the Justice Department or an advisory opinion from the FTC,
such clearance would be conditioned upon assurances that the mem-
bers of the group would not discuss resale prices for sale to American
36. Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U.S. 1018 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart 8- Co. v. Jos.
Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
37. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
38. United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 963 (D. Mass.
1950).
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or domestic competitive issues, and upon documentation that such
discussions were not occurring and would be prevented.39 However,
given the present state of the law, it seems very possible that firms
will choose to form and operate international buying groups without
seeking clearance from federal antitrust agencies or making any public
announcement of either the group's existence or the manner in which
it will operate.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis it seems reasonable to con-
clude that there are gTave doubts about the legal correctness and the
wisdom of declining to prosecute American buying groups with
monopolistic buying power which purchase from foreign sellers who
lack monopoly power.
III. International Buying Groups and Foreign Monopolists
A. The Cduntervailing Power Rationale
The most persuasive case for staying the application of our antitrust
laws to joint international buying groups is presented when the
American buyers demonstrate that they must deal with a foreign mo-
nopolist, either private or governmental, or with a foreign cartel that
has monopolistic power. In these circumstances, the American buyers
may argue not that their combined strength will exact an unusually
low price from the foreign monopolist or cartel, but rather that joint
action may better enable the American firms to bargain for a reason-
able price and resist being charged a supracompetitive rate which
would probably have to be passed on to consumers in the United States.
Speaking directly to this issue, Deputy Assistant Attorney General
for Antitrust Donald I. Baker stated recently:
[S]ome would . . . argue that antitrust prevents American firms
from operating effectively in the presence of foreign government
cartels. I do not think this argument will stand up to careful
analysis.
In fact, the Justice Department has authorized-and the Sher-
man Act permits-necessary cooperation among American firms
to deal with a foreign government buying or selling cartel, pro-
vided that cooperation does not spill over into the domestic
market.
40
39. For registration of Webb-Pomerene export associations, see 15 U.S.C. § 65 (1970);
Chapman, supra note 3, at 409. For a discussion of review by the Justice Department, see
C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 28, at 246. For the regulations governing FTC ad-
visory opinions, see 16 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1974).
40. Address by Baker at UCLA, Mercantilism and Monopoly-The Alternative To A
Competitive America, at 16-17, Nov. 16, 1973.
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Undoubtedly, one of the events on which these comments were
based was the Antitrust Division's Business Review Clearance in 1971
for joint oil company bargaining and cooperation in response to
collective demands for higher payments by the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (OPEC).41 In regard to that event, Senator
Proxmire wrote to Assistant Attorney General McLaren inquiring
whether the Division had granted the companies an "exemption" from
the antitrust laws and whether concerted action by the companies was
consistent with the 1968 consent decree ending the Oil Cartel case.42
McLaren replied by stressing, "The Department of Justice does not
have power to grant immunity to anyone for a violation of the anti-
trust laws or for a violation of a court decree. What we can do is
state our present enforcement intentions based on representations
that are made to us as to a course of conduct proposed to be un-
dertaken." 43 Turning to an analysis of the merits of the oil com-
panies' conduct, McLaren wrote:
The reported activities of the companies involve a joint effort on
th part of both large and small to assure that the concerted ap-
proach of the producing countries will not work to the greater
prejudice of some competitors-especially the smaller ones-than
to others. Faced with this combination of oil producing countries,
demanding higher fees in the form of taxes or royalties, the com-
panies' actions of which we are aware represent no more than a
countervailing force to minimize the adverse price effects on
consumers.
44
A theory of countervailing power as a justification for approval of
joint buying groups with market power has been only implicitly
recognized in American antitrust law in cases allowing joint em-
ployer bargaining against labor unions. 45 While this rationale would
not validate domestic buying groups, 40 it might justify buying groups
in an international situation. The relevance of that difference is that
41. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1971, at 11, col. 4; BNA 1971 ANTITRusT & TRADE REC. REP.
No. 496, at A-1.
42. See United States v. Standard Oil Co. (N.J.), 1969 Trade Cas. 72,742, at 86,647-48
(§ V(C)) (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
43. Letter from Richard McLaren, Chief of the Antitrust Division, to Sen. Proxmire,
Mar. 5, 1971, discussed in Borowitz, Joint Business Actions by Competitors: Are Any
Permissible?, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 683, 686-87 (1971); FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST
LAws 454-55 (W. Fugate ed. 1973).
44. Id.
45. NLRB v. Local 449, Truck Drivers, 353 U.S. 87 (1957); Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l
v. CAB, 502 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Clung v. Publishers Ass'n, 214 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.
N.Y.), af'd per curiam, 314 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1963); cf. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278
(1965); Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 211 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), af'd, 319 F.2d 366
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963) (strike insurance).
46. Cf. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 28, at 153.
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in a domestic situation, one could reasonably rely upon application
of the antitrust laws to remedy any selling cartel or monopoly with
which buyers were faced. In an international context, our antitrust
laws would be totally ineffective against a foreign cartel or monopoly,
particularly if it were governmentally inspired or managed. Thus,
the countervailing power justification appears to be more persuasive
as a rationale for allowing international buying groups than domestic
ones.
47
On the other hand, absent substantive government participation
or control, it is doubtful that allowing or encouraging joint bar-
gaining by private, profitmaking firms is likely to secure significant
benefits for American consumers. It appears that merely allowing
such joint activity cannot guarantee that the group will achieve better
results than if separate bargaining took place. Nor is it easy to en-
sure that negotiations between the companies and the cartel will
be adversarial and arm's-length, and that any saving attained will
be substantially passed on to American consumers.
First, bargaining results may be more closely related to the strength
of the cartel, the scarcity of the commodity, and the availability of
substitute products than to the number of buying corporations ne-
gotiating as a unit. Moreover, it is not clear that corporate self-
interest guarantees that firms will always negotiate jointly for the
lowest possible price when economic circumstances will allow them
instead to cooperate with the foreign sellers and pass on increases
to consumers in America. Assuming that the foreign monopoly or
cartel picks the American buyers with which it will deal, and that
supply and demand characteristics are such that the joint buyers
can easily pass on price increases to the ultimate consumers, it seems
problematical whether the joint buying group will negotiate vigor-
ously for the lowest possible prices and will not instead make a
"sweetheart deal" with a foreign cartel at least to split the profits on
resale in the United States. In a scarcity situation, such as the oil
47. It appears that the countervailing power argument has appeared persuasive to
foreign antitrust officials. For instance, the British Restrictive Practices Court at one
time took the view that the existence of a foreign selling cartel justified the creation of
a buying group of British manufacturers. In re National Sulphuric Acid Ass'ns Agree-
ment, L.R. 4 R.P. 169 (Rest. Prac. 1963), aff'd on other grounds, L.R. 6 R.P. 210 (1966).
The selling cartel in that case was composed of American sulphur companies operating
through a WVebb-Pomerene export association. In reaction to the American selling cartel,
the British National Sulphuric Acid Association was established as a nonprofit organiza-
tion for the joint purchase of all the sulphur required by its members for the manu-
facture of acid. Membership was open to all British manufacturers of sulphuric acid,
but resale to persons outside the group was not permitted.
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buying group faced, there may be particularly strong incentives to
assure supply through such a deal and pass on the costs to consumers.
In recent testimony,4s Assistant Attorney General Kauper declared
ineffective for the future the favorable business review clearances
which he and his predecessors had granted to the association of oil
companies for joint bargaining with the oil producing nations in
the period 1971-1973. Kauper suggested that the Antitrust Division
had not intended to authorize a permanent cooperative organization
of oil companies. He noted that the studies and discussions of the
companies' joint bargaining committee4 9 were tending ever closer
to sensitive competitive subjects such as estimates of supply and
demand and proposals regarding "buy-back" arrangements. He also
observed that recent government expropriations of oil property and
formation of national oil companies had changed the relationship
of the oil companies to the OPEC nations from one of buyer-seller
or taxpayer-government to one between actual or potential com-
petitors. Kauper was careful to stress that the Antitrust Division had
not yet concluded that any past activity of the oil buying group was
violative of the antitrust laws, or that future joint bargaining would
necessarily involve any violation. 50 Nor did he state or imply that
business review clearance would be denied in the future to other
buying groups. Nevertheless, he did recognize the possible antitrust
violations arising out of an international buying group.
B. Foreign Government Cartels
Whatever the strengths or weaknesses of the countervailing power
rationale for allowing joint bargaining with foreign monopolists, it
is beginning to appear that other antitrust "exemptions" may be
relevant to the joint negotiation issue. Recently, foreign governments
in countries with valuable natural resources have sought to increase
government revenues from those resources by concertedly demanding
higher taxes or royalties for the right of extraction or exportation,
or by collectively insisting on some form of "partnership" with
American firms. Often, the American buyers have sought to act
jointly to protest such a demand or to negotiate about its terms. In
this context, there are additional legal bases besides countervailing
48. Statement of Thomas E. Kauper, Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., Before the Sub-
comm. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, June 5,
1974 (hearings to be published).
49. This bargaining group was called the "London Policy Group."
50. Statement, supra note 48.
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power to justify the conclusion that such joint bargaining does not
violate American antitrust laws. The Supreme Court has held that
the antitrust laws were not designed to prohibit or penalize con-
certed activity by competitors to obtain favorable governmental action
from a legislative or administrative agency.51 It remains debatable
whether the right to seek to influence governmental action should
extend to dealings with foreign governments.5 2 But even assuming
there is no quasi-constitutional right to engage in such conduct, one
might still conclude that it is beyond the intended coverage of the
Sherman Act.
Moreover, the courts have also ruled that antitrust liability can-
not be premised upon a competitive effect which is the direct re-
sult of a conscious act of state of a foreign government. 3 The anti-
trust legality of joint actions abroad depends on the type and ex-
tent of the demands made by the foreign governments. The courts
have declared that as a general rule, conduct required by foreign
law will not be deemed to violate the Sherman Act.5 4 The law
is less clear in regard to conduct which is requested or induced by
foreign officials. The Oil Cartel consent decrees seem to recognize
foreign government inducement or economic necessity as justifica-
tions for engaging in otherwise prohibited acts. 55
On the other hand, the courts have been unwilling to permit a de-
fense to be based on mere foreign government approval or on foreign
government actions which the defendant companies arranged in order
to further their own monopolistic scheme. In United States v. Sisal
Sales Corp.,56 the indictment alleged that defendants conspired to
monopolize sales of sisal (a material used in making rope) from
Yucatan, Mexico, to the United States by inducing Mexican officials
to recognize the conspirators as the exclusive buyers and sellers of
the product and to impose discriminatory taxes on possible rival
51. UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. President's Conf. v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
52. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Oil & Gas Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal.
1971), aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
53. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Occidental Petro-
leum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 108-11 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Graziano,
Foreign Governmental Compulsion as a Defense in United States Antitrust Law, 7 VA. J.
INT'L L. 100, 132 (1967). But see United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). For
a discussion of the act of state doctrine, see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398 (1964).
54. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &- Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962)
(dicta); United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1963
Trade Cas. 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (dicta).
55. See United States v. Standard Oil Co. (N.J.), 1969 Trade Cas. 72,742 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
56. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
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sellers. Defendants urged that their alleged actions were immunized
against antitrust attack by the act of state doctrine. 7 The Supreme
Court rejected this reasoning, ruling instead that a conspiracy to
monopolize formed in the United States for the purpose of securing
a monopoly of sales to the United States will not be immunized
simply because one element of the conspiracy involved securing fa-
vorable action by foreign officials. In the 1962 Continental Ore
case the Court indicated that it continued to accept the reasoning
of Sisal Sales.08
It appears that implicit in these Supreme Court decisions is the
conclusion that the act of state doctrine does not apply if the foreign
government officials were mere pawns in a private conspiracy, rather
than a major moving force behind the scheme. It is difficult to infer
from the decided cases what the result would have been in a case
like Sisal Sales if, for example, the foreign ambassador had sent a
note to the Court stating that it was the official policy of the foreign
government to select a "chosen instrument" for buying and selling
the product in order to create a monopoly and raise the price, thereby
increasing the government's tax take. What if the foreign government
acknowledged that the idea for the exclusive buyer-seller scheme had
come from a group of American companies, but stated that the idea
was so good for the country's interest that it was adopted as a matter
of national law and policy? Would there then be any recourse under
American antitrust law against the companies which urged the scheme
on the foreign government? Present law does not provide a definitive
answer.
It is with some trepidation that one attempts to apply these nascent
and inexact rules to the political and commercial realities of modern
joint bargaining. It is certainly conceivable that American companies
might be commanded to appear together and bargain jointly with a
foreign government monopolist or cartel, or even to cooperate in
achieving the restrictive purposes of a producer cartel. It is doubtful
that foreign laws would command such conduct. More realistically,
the compulsion enforcing such a demand would arise from an ex-
press or implied threat by the foreign government to boycott the
companies or even to expropriate their foreign holdings. The ques-
57. Id. at 271 (citing American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909)).
58. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 705 (1962).
(Canada made a subsidiary of defendant an exclusive agent for importation of certain
substances. "As in Sisal, the conspiracy was laid in the United States, was effectuated
both here and abroad, and respondents are not insulated by the fact that their con-
spiracy involved some acts by the agent of a foreign government.")
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tion then is whether the United States should accord such economic
pressure the legal status of an antitrust defense if it sees the foreigners'
scheme as being against its interest as a consumer nation. If the
American companies are called together merely to facilitate the uni-
form and prompt resolution of an economic dispute, American anti-
trust forbearance seems appropriate. But if the companies are pres-
sured to cooperate in a scheme to exact higher prices from American
consumers, it would seem well within the discretion of American
courts to afford no weight or legitimacy to the foreign inducement
and to compel the companies to obey American law even at the
cost of alienating their foreign sources of supply.50
IV. Acceptable Conduct by Bargaining Groups
We have seen that there is an arguable, though highly debatable,
case for sometimes permitting or even assisting international buying
groups as a countervailing force to foreign cartels, and for holding
that joint activities in relation to foreign taxation or participation
programs are outside the intended coverage of the Sherman Act.
Nevertheless, even assuming these premises, American antitrust law
will still be relevant to the manner in which the buying group is
organized and joint bargaining is conducted.
The first issue here centers on admission to such buying groups.
There is a considerable body of American case law, from United
States v. Terminal Railroad Association,6" through Associated Press
v. United States,"' to Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,2 holding
that businessmen who jointly control a crucial economic facility must
make entrance to the group available on reasonable, nondiscrimina-
tory terms to all whose ability to compete would be seriously im-
paired by exclusion. It would thus follow that a syndicate for dealing
with a foreign monopolist or cartel would be legal only if member-
59. Cf. First Nat'l City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 316 U.S.
948 (1960) (dictum) (corporation may have to obey U.S. court order even at risk of
losing right to do business in a foreign state; "If the Bank cannot, as it were, serve two
masters and comply with the lawful requirements both of the United States and of
Panama, perhaps it should surrender to one sovereign or the other the privileges re-
ceived therefrom."); Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Ma-
atschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (plaintiff may challenge validity of Nazi acts of
state).
60. 224 U.S. 383 (1912) (an association of railroads sharing certain tracks tried un-
successfully to deny admission to certain other railroads).
61. 326 US. 1 (1945) (all newspapers must be allowed to use Associated Press facilities).
62. 373 U.S. 341 (1962) (all brokers must be allowed to use stock exchange).
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ship in it is open on reasonable terms to all who have a competitive
need to participate. 3 Similarly, serious antitrust questions would arise
if American firms, in dealing with foreigners controlling a scarce
resource, agreed to higher prices in exchange for exclusive rights and
thus prejudiced other American firms excluded from the buying group.
Given that a buying group open to all appropriate members may
not be illegal in itself when necessary to confront a foreign cartel
or government, the next issue concerns the range of acceptable tactics
that the group may employ. An important question is thfe extent to
which the majority of the group may impose its will on dissidents.
Certainly the visceral reaction of most antitrust enforcers, as well
as most Americans, would be that the group should have no power
or right to coerce uniformity among its members. Yet the issue is
not quite as simple as it appears. May the members agree to be
bound by a majority vote in bargaining positions? If so, then it
is clear that a company may be compelled by the votes of its com-
petitors to take an economic position it would not have adopted if
acting alone. Suppose the old price is $4, the foreign cartel asks for an
increase to $6, the buying group decides to offer $5, and after three
days of deadlock one American firm decides it would like to agree
to the $6 price. May the other members of the buying group attempt
to persuade the dissident to hold out a bit longer? Should any limits
be placed on the nature or the vigor of the persuasion? Existing
antitrust law seems generally to indicate that if such conduct amounted
to coercion, it would be illegal. In Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad
Co., 4 the Supreme Court, in considering the legality of an alleged
railroad conspiracy which required uniform adherence to discrimina-
tory rates, stated:
63. In considering discrimination by buying groups, FTC Chairman Dixon stated:
After considerable study of the problem, we decided the way to eliminate the
discrimination-hence the competitive injury-was not to condemn the buying group
but to open its doors to every other jobber who competes with one or more of the
group's members, to assure their competitors an equal opportunity to perform the
same services or "functions" for the manufacturer and be paid on the same basis.
The groups that are willing to do this-those that are willing to positively and
affirmatively invite all competing jobbers to join and receive the same low prices
as their existing members, to eliminate the discrimination, to eliminate the com-
petitive injury, to eliminate the receipt of payment for services and functions they
don't perform-are thus converting themselves into genuine, bona fide "cooperatives."
The others-those that insist on maintaining a closed, exclusive club, on receiving
not just a low price but a discriminatory price advantage over their competitors-
are showing their true colors, too. They aren't "small businessmen" seeking an
equally low price; they're powerful buyers demanding lower prices, prices that give
them a grossly unfair advantage over decidedly smaller firms than themselves.
Quoted in Mezines, Group Buying, 12 ANTriRusT BULL. 535, 553-54 (1967).
64. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
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[W]e find no warrant in the Interstate Commerce Act and the
Sherman Act for saying that the authority to fix joint through
rates clothes with legality a conspiracy to discriminate against a
State or a region, to use coercion in the fixing of rates, or to put
in the hands of a combination of carriers a veto power over
rates proposed by a single carrier. The type of regulation which
Congress chose did not eliminate the emphasis on competition and
individual freedom of action in ratemaking.65
The tendency of American public policy in this regard is illustrated
by the fact that when Congress adopted the Reed-Bulwinkle Act",
to legalize joint rate-fixing by railroads, it stated expressly that such
agreements could be approved by the ICC only if each party to the
agreement retains a "free and unrestrained right to take independent
action either before or after any determination arrived at through
such procedure."0' 7 Bargaining groups which seek to prevent inde-
pendent action by members may therefore violate the antitrust laws.
Another difficult question about permissible tactics is whether the
members of a buying group may agree to joint action if their bar-
gaining reaches impasse. Using the facts of the previous hypothetical,
if the foreign cartel sticks to its demand for a $6 price and the
American buyers hold fast to their $5 offer, may the Americans
jointly agree to withhold $1 when the price is demanded? If the
foreigners will not sell unless the $6 price is paid, may the American
firms agree not to buy any of the commodity, that is, to boycott the
foreigners? At an extreme, may they agree to boycott the foreigners
as to other products in order to exert leverage to reduce the price
of the first product? The obvious answer would seem to be that
when American companies jointly decline to purchase a commodity
normally consumed in this country, they are collusively restraining
the import trade of the United States and thus violating its antitrust
laws. If buying groups are permitted to bargain jointly with the
foreigners because of the existence of a cartel or monopoly, and if
obtaining a low price is important to consumers, to the balance of
payments and perhaps to other national interests, it may arguably
be illogical to deny them the leverage that a boycott might create.
Nevertheless, I think that, absent direct American government in-
volvement in the boycott, it is reasonable and desirable to ban such
tactics, even against a foreign cartel. First, there seems to be no basis
65. Id. at 458-59 (emphasis added).
66. 49 U.S.C. § 5(b) (1970).
67. Id. § 5(b)(6).
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at all in previous antitrust doctrine for excusing such a boycott that
denies products to American consumers. 8 In addition, the absence
of government control of the resale prices and profits of the bar-
gaining firms means that there is no assurance that the lower pur-
chase price the boycott is intended to induce will benefit the public.
Finally, it must also be remembered that foreign trade and foreign
relations are not "zero-sum games" in which there is simply a winner
and a loser.0 9 Using power tactics to exact a concession, perhaps from
a developing country seeking to exploit one of its few valuable re-
sources, may be against the long run foreign policy interests of the
United States even if it fends off an unwelcome price increase for
a while. It may be even worse policy if employed against a powerful
state which has at its disposal numerous means of economic and
diplomatic retaliation. 0
V. The Role of Government in Joint Bargaining
One of the most difficult issues arising from joint international
bargaining by firms with combined monopoly power is what role the
United States Government should play. If the particular commodity
is important, should the Government have the power to require the
bargaining firms to refuse to pay the price demanded by the foreign
government or cartel? At the other extreme, should the Government
68. For the rule that the Sherman Act prohibits boycotts, see Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Kor's Inc. v. Broadway Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207
(1959). This prohibition of boycotts extends to foreign commerce. United States v. Ham-
burg-American S.S. Line, 200 F. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), 216 F. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1914), rev'd on
other grounds, 239 U.S. 466 (1916); United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Nay. Co., 228
U.S. 87 (1913). See also United States v. Diamond Dealers Club, Inc., 1952 TRADE REG.
REP. 4 66,036 (criminal), 66,042 (civil) (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (government attacked an agree-
ment among U.S. diamond dealers and Belgium association to boycott the diamond in-
dustry of Germany; defendants entered nolo contendere pleas in the criminal action; the
civil case was settled by consent judgment). A more recent case is United States v.
American Soc'y of Mechanical Engineers, Inc., Civil No. 1807-M (D. Mass., July 22, 1970)
(government challenged a conspiracy against foreign manufacturers of boilers and pres-
sure vessels), 1972 Trade Cas. 74,028 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (consent settlement).
69. See T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1962).
70. This discussion does not imply that there would be no benefit or utility in form-
ing a buying group. Provided that there is neither coercion of members nor a collective
boycott, those in the group could agree to reject an offer by the foreign seller, or even
to terminate the negotiations. The possibility of such action would be important in the
bargaining process if, for example, the seller wished to legitimate his position by ob-
taining the collective assent of the buyers, or if cooperation among the buyers was vital
in implementing the new terms or conditions of sale. Of course, if an offer were re-
jected or the negotiations terminated by the buying group, the Sherman Act would
prohibit any subsequent agreement not to buy or import the product. However, uni-
formity among the group members in refusing to deal with an unreasonable foreign
seller would not in itself prove the existence of an illegal course of concerted. conduct.
Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1959); Mil-
gram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579, 583 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 929 (1952).
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be able to compel them to pay the price rather than have negotiations
break down? Should the Government even suggest how the firms
should bargain? If orders or suggestions are thought vital to the na-
tional interest, what is the legal authority for such an active govern-
mental role in foreign trade?71 True, the antitrust laws provide a
basis for enunciating some of the rules for conducting joint negotia-
tions, but they can hardly be used as authorization or guidance for
active government superintendence of how to bid or how much to pay.
Present United States law does not authorize, or even provide policy
objectives to justify, the participation by government officials in the
formulation or tactical implementation of bargaining strategies of
American corporations dealing with foreign monopolies or cartels.
Certainly, American officials know that national policy generally
favors friendship with other nations, a "favorable" balance of trade,
low prices for consumer goods and an assured supply of strategic
commodities. But these objectives are quite general and can obviously
be contradictory in the context of a particular negotiation.
In some other nations the government is an owner or stockholder
in that country's major international companies, and thus has a
clear legal right to influence the decisions of such companies. Some
countries require that particular types of foreign trade be conducted
only by state trading organizations. This provides the most direct
form of state control over international bargaining for commodities
thought vi.tal to the nation's interest. At least until now, America
has always rejected these approaches, relying instead on our antitrust
laws, on corporate strength, self-interest and statesmanship, and on
informal diplomatic persuasion of foreign governments and American
multinational corporations. However, as has been discussed, our anti-
trust laws probably do not provide a solution in themselves.
Using governmental recommendations to "guide" the behavior and
bargaining of our multinational corporations may be effective on
occasion, but it is obviously an uncertain procedure; a corporate
executive is obviously free under our system to take the position that
he will not prejudice the profit interests of his stockholders in order
71. In Senate hearings related to the oil cartel, Senator Church suggested to Federal
Energy Administrator John Sawhill that legislation should be passed requiring the sub-
mission to the FEA of all major international oil agreements by American companies
and setting forth standards under which FEA would approve or reject such contracts.
Sawhill agreed that such legislation would be desirable. A bill approved by a Senate
Foreign Relations subcommittee requires the Federal Energy Administrator to approve
all long term contracts between American companies and foreign governments. BNA 1974
ANTITRUsr & TRADE REG. REP. No. 680, at A-16. It is difficult to estimate the likelihood
that such a bill would be adopted by the Congress. See note 9 supra.
288
Vol. 84: 268, 1974
Antitrust and International Buying Cooperation
to comply with the suggestion of a government official that a less
profitable course would be better for foreign relations, the balance of
payments, national defense, or the like. Yet, if the company follows
the suggestion as a favor to the Government, the implication may
arise that the Government then "owes" the company a reciprocal
favor, perhaps in the form of lenient law enforcement. Confidence
in the primacy of the rule of law in our nation requires that the re-
lation between profitmaking corporations and government should be
at arm's length, governed by statutorily determined rights, obligations
or incentives, not by bureaucratic requests for corporate favors. In
antitrust law this principle has been expressed in the longstanding
doctrine that conduct violative of the Sherman Act will not be ex-
cused because it was done with the knowledge, approval or even en-
couragement of government officials. 2 On the other hand, corporate
conduct directly induced or compelled by government officials in
order to achieve the purpose of a statute designed to provide a sub-
stitute for normal free market forces normally will not be held
illegal under the antitrust laws."3
These issues are highlighted by the so-called "voluntary" steel
import quotas.74 'The facts appear to be that in 1969, under pressure
from House and Senate Committees threatening legislative import
quotas to protect the domestic steel industry from foreign competition,
and after negotiations with State Department officials, the major
Japanese and European steel manufacturers agreed to work out co-
operative plans under which they would limit the amount of their
exports to the United States for a three-year period. Both the Euro-
pean and the Japanese producers announced their agreement to the
plan in letters which stated that it was their understanding that the
plan would not violate the laws of the United States. Nevertheless, a
number of prominent American lawyers questioned whether the
agreements were legal under our antitrust laws.", This arrangement
was challenged by Consumers Union in 1972, but the parties agreed
to a dismissal with prejudice of the antitrust allegations in the
complaint"
6
72. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 705 (1962);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
73. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
74. See Note, Cartelization, Executive Sanction, and the Antitrust Laws: The Steel
Import Case, 18 ANTiThus-r BuLL. 853 (1973).
75. See Symposium, Antitrust Enforcement in the Atlantic Community, 40 ANnTRUST
L.J 761, 796, 801-04 (1971) (comments of Rahl, Maw & Fugate).
76. Consumers Union, Inc. v. Kissinger, Civil No. 73-1095 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 11, 1974),
aff'g as modified 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1973). Notwithstanding the dismissal, U.S.
District Judge Gerhard A. Gesell expressed his view that the agreement was not lawful
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The Defense Production Act of 195077 should also be noted here.
Although unused against buying groups and little discussed in the
literature, this statute would both allow the government to play a
substantial role in foreign trade and enable businessmen to secure
a complete antitrust exemption to exert concerted buying power against
foreigners. In broad summary, the Act provides that in the event of
world conditions threatening the supply to the United States of a
commodity important to national defense, the Secretary of the In-
terior may declare that an emergency exists. 78 A special government-
industry advisory group may then be established to discuss problems of
supply and possible solutions.70 A plan of action may then be drafted
and submitted to the Attorney General for approval and to the Chair-
man of the FTC for review. Once the plan is approved, anything
done under it is declared by § 708 of the Act to be fully exempted from
the operation of the antitrust laws.
80
Most average international trade situations and strategies would not
fall within the intended purview of the Defense Production Act. How-
ever, if a foreign monopoly, cartel or boycott did threaten the ability
of American firms to obtain a crucial commodity, the Act provides
a means by which, with the consent or advice of the Department
under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (agreement induced by public officials for a
public purpose are immune under the antitrust laws). He stated that "the Executive has
no authority under the Constitution or acts of Congress to exempt the Voluntary Restraint
Arrangements on Steel from the antitrust laws and that such arrangements are not
exempt." 352 F. 8upp. at 1323. Although Judge Gesell did not explain his reasoning in
detail, he apparently believed that an implied exemption would be appropriate only if
the State Department officials had acted under a statute specifically authorizing them
to negotiate with private corporations for restraints on American foreign commerce. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that negotiating voluntary
agreements was within the President's authority. The majority vacated the antitrust
discussion in the district court and refused to consider whether the President's actions
created antitrust immunity for the private parties, noting that Gesell's statement was
dictum and that the Justice Department had stated to the district court that no participant
was assured of antitrust immunity. In dissent, Judge Leventhal argued that the executive
actions were ultra vires and that no antitrust immunity or exemption should result from
them; however, he concluded that the ruling should be prospective only, so that the
parties would not be liable for treble damages.
77. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2061-2166 (1970).
78. Id. § 2093(g).
79. Id. § 2158(a).
80. Pursuant to § 708(e) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, Id. § 2158(e), the
Attorney General is directed to review the administration of that Act to determine any
factor which may tend to eliminate competition, create or strengthen monopolies, injure
small business, or otherwise promote undue concentration of economic power. The 1955
amendments to the Defense Production Act, Act of Aug. 9, 1955, ch. 655, § 6, 69 Stat.
581, require the Attorney General to issue reports on these matters every three months,
and to include in those reports a review of all voluntary agreements approved under
§ 708. Such reports have been regularly submitted. See generally Review of Voluntary
Agreements Program under the Defense Production Act, Reports submitted by the Att'y
Gen. to the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency (1956-1974).
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of the Interior, the Justice Department and the FTC, the affected
companies could form virtually any kind of counter-cartel without
fear of antitrust sanctions.
Conclusion
This article began with the inquiry whether United States anti-
trust laws unduly hamper our businessmen in international trading.
In my view, analysis of our antitrust laws as applied and interpreted
reveals that they are not an undue hindrance to necessary or even
useful forms of cooperation in international buying. Cooperation to
achieve cost savings and efficiencies among small companies lacking
market power is undoubtedly legal, as can be deduced from the ap-
plication of antitrust laws to domestic buying groups. Those types
of joint group activities which the antitrust laws do prohibit are
ones which are likely to injure competitive businesses in America
and to interfere with American foreign relations. We have also seen
that the antitrust laws have not yet been applied to prohibit American
firms from bargaining jointly with a foreign government or cartel.
However, even if bargaining groups are permissible, it does appear
that the law should and would be applied to guarantee appropriate
access to these groups, to limit somewhat the methods and tactics
which may be employed, and perhaps to prevent "sweetheart deals"
with foreign cartels. Finally, given the justifiable American suspicion
of unchecked private power, it would seem far preferable that any
such counter-cartels be composed of, or closely supervised by, the
affected consumer governments themselves.
All this is not to say that the conduct of international trading as
a contest between rival buying and selling cartels is in any sense a
desirable development. Economists and statesmen have pointed out
that although cartels may gain short term advantages by distorting the
factors which influence supply, demand and price, such conduct in the
long run will "n6t only engender retaliation but will also cause a frantic
search for substitute products and alternative markets, which may well
erode whatever gains the concerted activity initially achieved.8' Cer-
81. "Experience suggests that cartels are difficult to organize and more difficult to
execute. They require effective control over supply. Producers can be induced to export
in excess of the quota if additional sales offer the immediate prospect of additional
earnings to each. Even assuming a degree of discipline and unanimity among producing
countries than past experience suggests is unlikely, success would probably be short-lived.
The stimulus to production, the shift to substitutes, the encouragement to new tech-
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tainly, an American governmental policy designed to impress free
market principles upon those foreign businesses that seek monopoly
selling or buying power would be better than a policy of increasingly
permissive antitrust interpretation or legislation designed to facilitate
creation of American counter-cartels. Experience teaches us that once
created, such cartels are extremely difficult to guide, to control and
to eliminate. Moreover, counter-cartels may help to buttress or stabilize
a producer cartel that would otherwise splinter and disintegrate.82
Therefore, we must now hold fast to the fundamental principles of
competition embodied in our laws, before they are irretrievably washed
away in the treacherous currents of international economic crises.
nologies that economize on use and consumer resistance are likely to leave producers
in due course in a worse position than before, with markets irreversibly lost." Statement
of Thomas 0. Enders, Ass't Sec'y of State for Economic and Business Affairs, Before the
Economic Growth Subcomm. of the Jt. Economic Comm., July 25, 1974 (hearings to be
published).
82. "In the petroleum market, corporate behavior has facilitated collusion among
exporting countries. The oil companies have willingly participated in a tax structure
that discourages competitive behavior, have regulated output themselves, have created
an artificial pricing system, and have capitulated in demands for price increases."
Krasner, supra note 2, at 77.
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